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The WEEKLY SUMMARY, issued every Friday morning by the Office of Current Intelligence, reports and analyzes significant developments of the week through noon on Thursday. It frequently includes material coordinated with or prepared by the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Topics requiring more comprehensive treatment and therefore published separately as Special Reports are listed in the contents.

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VIETNAM



South Vietnamese Marines cheer recapture of citadel at Quang Tri.

MORE FIGHTING

1 The Communists stepped up the fighting in several parts of South Vietnam last week as part of their plan, [redacted]


[redacted] to intensify the action during September and October. The Communists clearly are not capable of, and are not talking of, pulling off something to rival their three-pronged offensive last spring. Much as they might hope for some dramatic new successes, their current purpose

seems to be to enhance their position on the ground for the contingency of either a cease-fire or of further prolonged fighting.

Communist ambitions obviously have been dealt a blow by the loss of the Quang Tri Citadel. Even so, the Communists as yet show no signs of giving up the fight for the rest of Quang Tri Province or elsewhere in the north. There are indications that they may be preparing counter-strikes along Route 1 and nearer to Hue. And

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situation is considered critical by South Vietnam's regional commander, General Truong, particularly since he may have to take forces from the Quang Tri - Hue area to strengthen the defenses to the south.)

Enemy forces in the central highlands appear inadequate to mount another drive similar to that undertaken against Kontum Province last spring. Nevertheless, these forces are conducting limited operations to isolate government bases and towns in western Pleiku Province and to tie down government forces.

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Military action in the region around Saigon has been fairly quiet of late, but there have been numerous reports that the Communists are trying to move troops and supplies closer to the capital and are making plans to increase terrorism and road harassment. One purpose of this activity, some sources say, is to prepare for main-force thrusts closer to Saigon in October.

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Currently, the major Communist units in the region, the 7th and 9th divisions, are well north of Saigon around Route 13, and north of An Loc, respectively. Units of both divisions probably have recovered enough from earlier fighting at An Loc to undertake new offensive moves. While it is highly unlikely that the Communists consider these forces capable of attempting a major attack on Saigon, it is conceivable that they might try to infiltrate companies or battalions into the capital area for a dramatic strike.

while government reserves are still tied down in the Quang Tri - Hue area, the Communists appear determined to make inroads into the populated coastal areas of Quang Nam, Quang Tin, and Quang Ngai.)

Following up attacks they launched last month against the Que Son Valley of Quang Nam and Tien Phuoc District of Quang Tin, the Communists struck hard this week in Quang Ngai, overrunning a district capital and threatening several more with the division that recently moved to the province from the central highlands. The

The Communists also appear to be planning for greater offensive activity in the delta, where they have increased their forces. They are moving in supplies and equipment, including heavier artillery. They have about five regiments around Base Area 470 in the northern delta and the equivalent

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of at least two divisions in the western and southern delta. Last week, there was a sharp increase in shellings and attacks against government outposts in provinces around these enemy concentrations, notably Dinh Tuong and Kien Hoa in the upper delta and Chuong Thien and Kien Giang to the west. >

/ <The Communists could try to use these forces to attack major towns, although the delta terrain makes them especially vulnerable to air action. In any event, the presence of the enemy units and the destruction of government outposts have been sufficient to cause some pullback of government administrators and troops toward the towns, enabling the Communists to circulate more freely in unprotected hamlets, where they can recruit and forage for supplies. Should the larger enemy units be withdrawn or forced out, such setbacks to pacification might be fairly rapidly reversed; if not, the deterioration could be more lasting. >

THE CEASE-FIRE OPTION

/ <While pressing every military opening, the Communists seem to be thinking and talking more about a cease-fire. >

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[redacted] enemy planning is of a contingency nature, with a cease-fire dependent on the prior establishment of a coalition government and the acceptance of other basic Communist peace demands. There have, however, been a few reports suggesting that a cease-fire might take place before a coalition is established. These latter reports could mean that the Communists may plan at some time in the next few months to accept the American offer of a cease-fire followed by discussions between Saigon and the Communists about the political future in South Vietnam. >

/ <Communist public pronouncements do not go this far. Both Pham Van Dong's national day speech on 2 September and the Viet Cong's statement on 11 September insist on concessions from the US on both the military and the political front before a cease-fire. But these statements do contain hints that Hanoi is talking about the need for the US to accept the notion of a coalition "in

principle" before a cease-fire, leaving the details of the coalition to be worked out later >

/ <From Hanoi's point of view, the advantages of a formal cease-fire during the period of the actual formation of a coalition might well seem more attractive than fighting along present lines until the new government was established. In a cease-fire environment, the Communists would doubtless anticipate considerable disorganization on the government side which they could exploit with their own tight political and military organization. Moreover, Communist cadre during a cease-fire presumably could more easily move into territory, especially urban areas, now denied them. >

/ <At the same time, a Communist willingness to accept, prior to cease-fire, only the promise of a coalition and to engage in a struggle later to see it develop in their favor, would represent something of a gamble. The Communists cannot be certain that they would come out on top. Such uncertainty, in fact, may lie behind the passage in the Viet Cong statement that the Communists are willing to agree with the US that a coalition would not be dominated either by the Communists or by the Saigon government but that both sides would form a coalition "on the basis of mutual non-elimination," a term implying no reprisals by either side. If they saw developments after a cease-fire going against them, they would be certain to invoke this understanding in an effort to protect themselves against gains by the government side. >

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ISRAEL: MORE OF THE SAME

2 Tel Aviv intends to press on with its "war" against the Arab fedayeen in the wake of Munich. The Israelis followed up their 8 September air strikes into Syria and Lebanon with a 36-hour ground-air operation into southern Lebanon on 16-17 September. Damascus clearly sees itself as the target for the next Israeli attack, and there are indications that the Israelis are preparing for just such an action. >

Strike Into Lebanon

2 At first light on 16 September, an Israeli armored force—estimated at about 2,000—crossed into southern Lebanon to "clean-out" fedayeen concentrations just below the Litani River—some 15 miles inside the border. The Israeli operation involved the flushing out of fedayeen in some 20 villages in the area, and an air strike at the town of Nabiteyah—some 25 miles from the border. Nabiteyah was reputed to be the fedayeen southern headquarters. Combined with this action were more air strikes against a dozen or so fedayeen bases in the Arqub area stretching into the country's most eastern corners. Israeli Chief of Staff Elazar said the Israeli action was not a reprisal for the killing of two Israeli soldiers in the Mt. Hermon area, but part of Israel's "war" against the fedayeen. >

3 Some 200 Lebanese houses were blown up in the operation, a minimum of 60 fedayeen were killed, and two bridges over the Litani were destroyed. Elazar indicated that the army would have killed hundreds of fedayeen if they had not fled. Lebanese Army units were involved and lost 17 killed as well as some 44 wounded or missing. Figures on Lebanese civilian casualties are incomplete, but apparently were high. The Israelis lost three killed and had six wounded. >

4 Although the Israelis killed relatively few fedayeen, Tel Aviv achieved another objective by pushing the Beirut government into renewed

efforts to curb fedayeen activity. Tel Aviv has consistently held the host government equally responsible for guerrilla actions, and the real and potential threat of an Israeli strike is designed to force the governments to act. >

The Lebanese Response


5 In this case, the Lebanese responded with a government "ultimatum" issued on 16 September to the fedayeen to evacuate villages near the border. The army apparently hopes to enforce the order. If the army really cracks down on the fedayeen, the action could bring down the Lebanese Government or lead to civil disturbances since the country is sharply divided in attitude toward the fedayeen. Radical Sunni Muslims and leftists in parliament have called for complete freedom of action for the fedayeen. Prime Minister Salam, who denied that any ultimatum was sent, has met with Fatah chief Arafat to work out an accommodation. Arab League Secretary General Riad has also arrived in Beirut to mediate between the Lebanese Army and the fedayeen. He will be trying to soften the restriction of fedayeen activity, it being the position of both Egypt and Syria that the fedayeen should be encouraged to do their things but from some one else's territory. Any deal that does not remove the commandos from the south will risk further strikes from Israel. >

Syria is Next

3 Syria is another target for further Israeli military action. Arab fedayeen—assisted by Syrian regulars—continue to shell Israeli settlements in the Golan Heights. Such actions have continued after the Israeli air strikes of 8 September and the Israeli thrust into Lebanon. The semi-official Israeli newspaper *Davar* has warned that the operations in Lebanon were just part of a campaign "with much broader aims." The paper said that there were "many more" terrorist bases in

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Lebanon that had not been hit, and that there are "many terrorist bases in neighboring Syria as well," all within the reach of the Israeli defense forces. >

4 <Rooting the fedayeen out of Syria may pose a more difficult task than it is in Lebanon. The terrain is more difficult, the distances involved are greater, and the Syrian regulars appear ready to

put up a fight. Israel prefers operations that incur the fewest casualties, so Israeli military action against Syria will probably keep to the air as much as possible. Air strikes against fedayeen bases in Syria or perhaps some helicopter-commando operations as it used in Egypt may be in the cards.

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INDOCHINA

SOUTH VIETNAM: BUDDHISTS IN POLITICS

A group of An Quang Buddhist legislators headed by Senator Vu Van Mau is forming a new political organization to be composed of An Quang members holding elective offices down to village level. The organization allegedly will take a moderate line and direct its energies mainly against the Communists rather than the Thieu government. The legislators believe that Buddhists must prepare for the possibility of a cease-fire followed by political struggle with the Communists. The new group, one of the few active Buddhist political ventures in recent months, parallels recent efforts by some of the country's other political forces to join together in anticipation of a possible peace agreement.

The activities of the Buddhist legislators also continue a recent trend among the Buddhists toward anti-Communism and participation within the political system. Their new organization is a logical follow-up to An Quang successes in the 1970 and 1971 National Assembly elections, but the legislators will face a number of difficulties before they can make it a going concern. Their success could be limited by the lukewarm attitude of the influential An Quang religious hierarchy. The church's leadership has given its approval, but the bonzes do not plan to play an active role. Some An Quang religious, as well as some lay, leaders have indicated to the US Embassy that they are less than enthusiastic about the new group and that they do not expect it to have a great impact on South Vietnamese politics. On top of that, internal rivalries could develop, since the An Quang movement still contains a radical element that might try to push the new group toward a militant anti-government posture.

Press Decree Takes Effect

About ten Vietnamese-language newspapers, including two opposition journals, went out of business last week as the security deposit provision took effect. The required deposit was made by 18 Vietnamese-language papers; nearly half of the papers still publishing are considered opposition or independent journals. Although oppo-

nents of the government have thus retained a voice, it may well be more restrained than in the past.

CAMBODIA: RICE AND ROADS

Phnom Penh's rice situation was less precarious this week following the delivery of nearly 9,000 tons of rice from South Vietnam and Thailand. These deliveries boosted the capital's rice reserves to about a three-week's supply, thereby allowing the emergency US airlift of rice from Saigon to stop. Additional shipments of South Vietnamese and Thai rice are in the pipeline, and their arrival should tide the city over until the government is again able to bring rice to Phnom Penh from the northwest via Route 5.

Government forces finally ended the Communists' month-long hold over a section of that vital highway on 16 September, when they moved unopposed into the partially destroyed town of Ponley. Cambodian units met only token enemy resistance during the course of their cautious six-day advance along the road. As they withdrew, the Communists destroyed or damaged several key highway bridges. It will take time to repair the bridges and reopen the highway to regular traffic. Moreover, there are indications that the Communists are going to keep the pressure on government installations along Route 5. Early in the week, enemy troops harassed Cambodian troops west of Ponley and a few miles north of Kompong Chhnang. Communist harassment seems certain to increase later in the year after the rice harvest begins in the northwest.

A New Leader for the Army

In what may represent the first step toward a long overdue reorganization of the high command, Lon Nol has named Major General Sosthene Fernandez as army chief of staff. Fernandez, a competent career officer with a flair for organization, has lost little time in assuming his new duties. He has indicated that he will take responsibility for high-level direction of combat operations. He has stated that all field commanders wanting to communicate with Lon Nol must go through him.

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111 Despite this encouraging beginning, Lon Nol
 & may not be willing to go very far in relaxing his
 112 ineffective personal control over key military
 matters. Whatever the case, Fernandez' appoint-
 ment has already had a tonic effect on the mili-
 tary. Members of the General Staff have
 welcomed the move. It may also sit well with
 those lower ranking officers who recently have
 been airing a growing dissatisfaction with Lon
 Nol's leadership. And the appointment may help
 111 to restore some public confidence in the army—if
 only temporarily.>

112 Lon Nol may hope to get some political
 mileage out of the Fernandez appointment. The
 President knows that Fernandez is a close asso-
 ciate of Sirik Matak, Lon Nol's most prominent
 political critic. Lon Nol probably is also aware
 that Matak's refusal to rejoin the government is
 founded in part on his insistence that the Presi-
 dent must reduce his interference in important
 military matters. In view of these factors, the
 appointment may be a conciliatory gesture aimed
 at inducing Matak to accept Lon Nol's repeated
 offers of the vice presidency.>

LAOS: GOING NOWHERE UP NORTH

22 <Government forces attempting to recapture
 the Plaine des Jarres have had another bad week,
 as the Communists again effectively countered

cautious government efforts to advance. North
 Vietnamese troops launched a series of ground
 and artillery attacks against an eight-battalion
 task force trying to move forward along the
 western edge of the Plaine. One wing of the task
 force was forced to retreat to its starting point;
 the other was blocked near the southwestern edge
 of the Plaine. Effective air support enabled them
 to hold their ground.>

26 <The North Vietnamese may hope to deliver a
 heavy blow against this task force. Communist
 gunners have shelled the irregulars regrouping in
 the foothills at the Plaine's western edge.

22 <Strong Communist resistance also stymied
 Vang Pao's forces south of the Plaine. Elements
 of a task force were forced to retreat after briefly
 occupying several positions near Tha Tam Bleung.
 Another task force, in the Khang Kho area, has
 not made any appreciable advance toward the
 southern tip of the Plaine because of persistent
 Communist harassment and low morale among
 the irregulars.>

26 <The government may still have six or seven
 weeks before the onset of the dry season, but
 Vang Pao will find it difficult to clear the Plaine
 in the waning days of the monsoon. The morale
 of his troops is low and he has few reliable re-
 serves. >

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CHINA: ANOTHER QUIET ANNIVERSARY

All indications are that Peking, in commemorating National Day on 1 October, will again dispense with the grandiose parade, speeches and fireworks display formerly associated with the celebration. As they did last fall, the Chinese cite "economy" as the reason for the scaled-down celebrations. The regime's real desire, however, is to mask the continuing political disarray at home.)

That is not to say that Peking has nothing to celebrate as it approaches its 23rd birthday. It can point with pride to great strides in international acceptance in the past year, most notably China's entry into the UN and the summit conference in February with President Nixon. Moreover, in connection with Prime Minister Tanaka's visit, scheduled for next week, China and Japan are to announce an agreement normalizing relations.)

And on the domestic front, there have been some signs of progress toward political stabilization following the dramatic Lin Piao affair a year ago. Last month, Peking, in its treatment of Army Day, went a long way toward exonerating the armed forces from the treasonous deeds imputed to Lin Piao. There are also persistent reports that the central leadership is about to convene an important party conference to wrap up the many strings left untied since the downfall of the man personally chosen by Mao as his heir-designate.)

At this juncture, the regime still seems preoccupied with blackening Lin's name. The prolonged denunciation has given rise to considerable apprehension at the local level, particularly among cadre who interpret the persisting anti-Lin campaign as a sign that more heads will roll. In an apparent effort to allay these fears, Chinese domestic broadcasts have recently been giving heavy play to the theme that the current rectification movement will not be allowed to disrupt life throughout the country like the Cultural Revolution did. Judging from rampant speculation at the grass roots over the fate of a number of incumbent provincial leaders, these efforts toward reassurance are falling short.)

Meanwhile, the regime goes on implementing a number of moderate policies, many of which are diametrically opposed to radical proposals put forth a few years ago. Education policy is a case in point. An August article in the *People's Daily* firmly endorsed the old "conditional promotion system," whereby students who do not measure up are held back for another year. During the Cultural Revolution, radical elements roundly condemned this system, claiming—with some justification—that it discriminated against the children of workers and peasants and was in fact an excuse to deprive them of higher education. *People's Daily* glossed over this argument and insisted that it has been "difficult" to raise academic standards since the abolition of promotion based on merit.)

Peking also appears to have sharply reduced the scope of the highly unpopular program for sending youth to the countryside. The official New China News Agency announced on 10 September that 400,000 young people have been sent to live on farms this year—a significant decline from the three preceding years, when an estimated three million youth were assigned each year to live and work in the rural areas. Originally conceived as a means to spur development in the backward rural areas, rustication in recent years has been used to punish recalcitrant Red Guards, maintain discipline over other rambunctious youth, and ease urban unemployment.)

The program has created considerable resentment in rural areas, where the disgruntled urban youth are regarded as an unwelcome burden. In the cities, there is a growing security problem due to the influx of youth who have slipped back from the farm and resorted to crime to support themselves. The regime's decision to moderate the extent of the down-to-the-countryside movement is based in part on the recognition of the mounting seriousness of these problems.)

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MONEY TALKS

24 <Outstanding problems are not likely to be resolved at the annual meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development scheduled to begin on 25 September in Washington. The meetings are viewed by the 123 members largely as a forum for general discussions, not a place for decision.>

24 <Nevertheless, the IMF's report on the reform of the international monetary system is likely to be discussed. Although there is general agreement on the need for monetary reform and for reducing the dollar's international role, there is no consensus on the future form of the international monetary system.>

24 <Japan will try to maintain a low profile during the discussion. Tokyo has stated that it

would announce at the end of September a new policy initiative aimed at reducing its current account surplus during the next several years.

24 <The question of Taiwan's participation in the meetings could provoke sharp debate should a challenge to its seating occur. Taipei's decision to attend but not to participate in the election of executive directors reduces the risk that such a challenge will be made. A challenge may still be forthcoming and, if there is one, the matter may be referred to the executive directors for study.>

34 <Romania's application for membership in the two organizations is not likely to be controversial. At issue, however, is whether Bucharest is both willing and able to meet the fund's requirements for membership, including the regular and full reporting of economic and financial data.



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FRANCE: MORE SCANDAL

37 In the latest of a series of scandals that have rocked France since mid-1971, Gabriel Aranda, a left-wing Gaullist formerly on the staff of the Ministry of Equipment and Housing, threatened to expose corrupt links between the business world and the government unless France stops the supply of Mirage jet fighters to Libya.

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[redacted]
[redacted] He has released a few of the 136 documents he claims support his charges against 48 public figures. The Justice Ministry has brought charges against him, but he has hinted that unnamed colleagues are prepared to continue publishing the documents if he is unable to do so.

39 There are persistent rumors that only the tip of the iceberg has been revealed and that more scandals could bob to the surface at any time. By the beginning of this year, the French Government already faced nine separate cases of fraud, abuse of public confidence, influence peddling, extortion, outright theft, or a combination of these. In every case, there has been a connection,



Aranda

often tenuous but in a few cases specific, between the accused wrongdoers and members of the Gaullist political movement.

42 Some of the earlier cases were initiated by Finance Minister Giscard d'Estaing, a presidential aspirant who wants to use them to separate himself and his Independent Republicans from the Gaullists. The alleged irregularities in former prime minister Chaban-Delmas' tax returns were uncovered by the press. Only a few Gaullists seem to be directly involved, and even the innuendo-prone satirical press has not tried to implicate President Pompidou.

49 As matters stand now, these scandals do not promise to do major damage to Gaullist political fortunes or portend the complete loss of the Gaullist majority. But they have compromised the party's image after 11 untainted years under De Gaulle. 38 Pompidou's concern that Chaban-Delmas in particular could become a liability before the elections—which must be held by next March—was in part responsible for his dismissal this July. 37 One leading Gaullist has now called for early elections “to clear the air,” but Prime Minister Messmer has brushed the suggestion aside.

42 Opposition elements—particularly the Communists, whose own record in municipal government is clean—have moved to exploit the scandals, and their repeated accusations have kept these affairs continually before the public. Such attacks have been blunted a bit by the government's own investigations and by moves to correct irregularities.

42 Although concerned over the potential damage of additional sensational revelations, the government almost certainly will not recall the approximately 40 Mirages already delivered to Libya or allow Aranda to blackmail it about future shipments. Aranda, however, is more interested in revealing the alleged irregularities than in stopping the Mirages, and he admits to having conceived that threat at the last moment. 25X1
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YUGOSLAVIA VS. THE EMIGRES

Elated by the extensive publicity accorded their hijacking of a SAS airliner on 15 September, Croatian *ustashi* around the world now seem bent on further exploits. Belgrade has responded to the air piracy by attacking the tolerant attitude of countries with large colonies of Croat activists and demanding assurances that emigre violence be stopped.

In capturing world headlines, the three young terrorists accomplished in a few hours what rightist elements in Croatian emigre communities have failed to do for nearly three decades. Their success provided new impetus for an already active group of terrorists. Two Yugoslav tourist agency offices in Sydney, Australia were bombed on 17 September, and Spanish authorities have received anonymous phone calls threatening new violence unless they release the hijackers.

A leading Yugoslav party official, Stane Dolanc, has sharply reiterated Belgrade's demands



Croatian terrorists who shot the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden raise defiant but handcuffed hands.

for measures to prevent further incidents. His condemnation of the emigres and countries harboring them came in a hard-hitting speech to a mass rally in Slovenia on 17 September. He was reflecting Belgrade's growing anger and frustration over increased emigre violence during the last 17 months—since the murder of the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden last year. His words also reflect alarm over the success the emigres have had in recruiting young Croats. The fact that after 27 years of Tito's rule, Croatian youth is still attracted to the banners of former fascists is an indictment of his inability to satisfy aspirations of one of the country's important national minorities.

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BULGARIA'S BALKAN RELATIONS


After years of on-again, off-again verbal conflict, Bulgaria and Yugoslavia are gradually improving their relations. The initiative for the warming trend emanated largely from Sofia; the emanations came after Soviet party chief Brezhnev visited both countries a year ago. Elsewhere in the Balkans, Bulgaria's relations with Albania seem frozen, those with Greece and Turkey have suffered some setbacks, while ties with Romania have improved.

The most dramatic evidence of better Bulgarian-Yugoslav relations was a Bulgarian decision in June to permit the sale of Yugoslav newspapers in Sofia for the first time in 20 years. Recent economic talks at the ministerial level in Sofia and a meeting last month between Macedonian and Bulgarian party leaders in Skopje, the capital of the Yugoslav republic of Macedonia, have also contributed to the improved atmosphere.

The presence of the Bulgarian delegation in Skopje demonstrated the extent to which Bulgaria has modified its irredentist attitude toward that region. It also implied at least a temporary acknowledgement by Sofia that the Macedonians, whom it has steadfastly considered as ethnic Bulgarians, are in fact a separate people.

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62 Earlier this year, Bulgarian-Greek relations were set back by Athens' agreement to let the US Sixth Fleet units use Piraeus as a home port. Sofia has nevertheless continued discussions with Athens on a number of political and economic topics. Similar talks are being held with Ankara despite the adverse affects of two recent developments. In May, a Turkish airliner was hijacked to Sofia by four Turkish leftists, and the Bulgarians have sharply increased their long-standing efforts to assimilate the Pomaks, ethnic Bulgarians of the Moslem faith.

60 The improvement in Bulgarian-Romanian relations reflects in part Ceausescu's more cooperative attitude toward his allies. In addition, Zhivkov probably interprets Ceausescu's participation in the July Crimean summit as a signal of Moscow's approval of increased contact with maverick Romania.

NORWAY MAY REJECT EC ENTRY

113 Norwegian voters face their most important decision in many years in the referendum on

membership in the European Communities scheduled for 24-25 September. Despite massive government efforts, those favoring entry still trail in the polls. Even if the vote is favorable, the margin may be too small to influence parliament, which must ratify entry by a majority of three fourths.

115 Trygve Bratteli's minority Labor government has threatened to resign if the vote goes against membership. There is no provision in the constitution for new elections if he does resign, and most Norwegians would rather avoid the agony of an interim government until the regularly scheduled elections next fall. The Bratteli threat has, then, evidently swayed some voters; a September poll indicated the lead of those opposing entry had narrowed to only four percent, down from seven percent in August.

115 While anti-EC elements in nearly all major Norwegian parties are reportedly preparing for the eventuality of a government collapse, a desire to maintain government stability could still guide voters to decide in favor of membership. If the electorate does approve the referendum by a close majority, it will be another two weeks or so before parliament casts its binding votes on the subject. If the referendum is defeated, most observers feel that the government will not bother to submit the question to parliament at all.

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UGANDA: AMIN RAMPANT

A guerrilla group, composed of Tanzanian-based Ugandans opposed to President Amin, struck across the southern border on 17 September, moving through three towns and advancing about 60 miles into Uganda. Ugandan spokesmen claimed on 18 September that the army had recaptured the towns and had driven the rebels back toward the Tanzanian border. By the end of the week, the invasion evidently had collapsed, and remnants of the insurgents were trying to make their way out of the area.

Uganda first claimed the attack was carried out solely by 1,000 Tanzanian soldiers, but later asserted—again without credible evidence—that the rebel force was composed of both Ugandan guerrillas and Tanzanian soldiers supported by British and Israeli mercenaries.

A number of Ugandans, including army personnel, fled the country in January 1971 after Amin overthrew Milton Obote, who has resided since in Tanzania. The Obote supporters who led the attack evidently hoped to exploit Uganda's domestic difficulties and set off an internal uprising that would pave the way for Obote's return to power. Tanzanian troops were not directly involved, but President Nyerere obviously knew




Ugandan Troops in Kampala

of the attack. He allowed the Ugandans to use Tanzanian territory for military training and then provided them with logistical support. Nyerere placed his army on alert and moved reinforcements to the border with instructions to avoid incidents with Uganda. The bombings of the Tanzanian village of Bukoba by the Ugandan Air Force and the proximity of the two armies increases the possibility of clashes.

The conflict took on new complications on 20 September when five Libyan aircraft bound for Uganda with 400 troops and equipment were denied permission to overfly Sudan; when they did so anyway, they were forced to land in Khartoum. Sudan, unwilling to become involved in the Ugandan situation, seized the arms and forced the troops to return to Libya. Qadhafi's gesture seems likely to encourage Amin in his dispute with Tanzania.

The invasion worsened the precarious position of foreigners in Uganda, whose safety was



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already in serious doubt because of a series of xenophobic statements and actions by Amin whose government refused to guarantee their safety. Amin's charges of UK and Israeli complicity in the invasion increased the danger to British and Jewish residents and called into question the British presence. Amin's advisers urged the expulsion of the remaining British technical advisers, while the government radio asserted that British spies are living in Uganda. The government also issued a statement condemning what it called the delaying tactics of Asians ordered expelled by Amin in August. In this menacing atmosphere, the eccentric Amin may move against Westerners generally, including Americans. >



Amin is likely to view his army's success against the rebels as a further justification of his leadership, but he still faces tremendous problems. His erratic exercise of power has led to a stagnating economy and a security situation which at best could be described as very loose. Army officers who oppose him may yet take advantage of the current turmoil and attempt to oust him. If Amin stays, reprisals are likely to be carried out within Uganda against members of the tribal groups—mainly Acholi and Lango—that made up the bulk of the insurgents, and there is likely to be more intertribal fighting within the army. [redacted]

divisive problem was avoided when the Jordanian foreign minister, who would have faced considerable criticism over his country's position toward the fedayeen, declined to attend and sent a lower ranking delegation instead. >

24 Presidents Sadat and Qadhafi met in Tripoli from 15 to 18 September for further discussions of the projected union between their two countries. Agreement on the principles of full unity appears to have been reached, but the effort remains largely a paper exercise. A "temporary political command" composed of the two leaders was formed. It is to be replaced by a single elected chief of state after unity is finally achieved. In addition, Cairo was designated the future capital, and the leaders agreed to the eventual formation of what they were pleased to call a "consultative democratic republican" system of government and of a single political organization. A number of joint committees were set up to study the unification process. >

ARAB STATES: TOGETHERNESS

26 The Arab leaders are still talking about unity, but, as usual, are doing little to achieve it. >

23 A conference of Arab foreign ministers in Cairo from 9 to 13 September was marked by a show of harmony. The plight of the Palestinians after Munich appeared to be a unifying factor. The foreign ministers' final communique strongly endorsed the Palestinian's struggle as an "indivisible part of the international liberation movement." Several minor agreements were reached, and a preliminary strategy for the UN was discussed. The thornier issue of joint Arab action was put off by giving it to a newly created foreign affairs and defense committee for study. Another

25 For all the lip service it gives the concept, Cairo remains reluctant to commit itself wholeheartedly to full unity. Following the Tripoli meetings, several cautionary notes were sounded, including a statement that the establishment of such a state does not have to be achieved "all at once"; and that reality demands that unity be implemented in stages. Thus the outlook is for still more Egyptian foot-dragging. [redacted]


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BANGLADESH: SIGNS OF DISCORD

79 Prime Minister Mujib returned to Bangladesh on 14 September, some seven weeks after he flew to Britain for a gallstone operation. During his absence, the government, buffeted by growing economic problems and allegations of maladministration, came under increasing public criticism. Mujib himself remains widely revered, and his return may restore a measure of public confidence. Basic problems remain immense, and more protests—probably including criticism of Mujib himself—are likely.



Mujib

77 The main causes of discontent have been high food prices, persistent shortages of key commodities, and what many see as widespread corruption among members of the ruling Awami League. The government's image has also been damaged by extensive political interference in the bureaucracy and police, by delays in the presentation of a draft constitution, and by failure to announce a timetable for national elections. The passage of time, moreover, has diluted the euphoria that buoyed up the hard-pressed Ben-

galis following their successful struggle for independence.

77 Organized protest activities have been spreading. Several leftist groups that had cooperated to some extent with the regime have become its critics.

The country's leading far leftist, octogenarian Maulana Bhashani, has been vehemently denouncing the regime's failings and the excessive influence allegedly wielded by New Delhi. Leftist student leaders have publicly assailed some of Mujib's closest advisers. Violence against Awami Leaguers has risen; murders of party workers are said to be running at two or three per week.

9 Bengalis inside and outside the government have sought to blame the country's troubles on foreign powers. The main scapegoat now is China, which is resented because of its support for Pakistan and its veto of Bangladesh's application for UN membership. The US was widely criticized for favoring Pakistan last year, but antipathy toward Washington has partially eased in recent months because of large-scale economic aid and support for Bangladesh's UN bid. India, which also has furnished massive aid, has sought to maintain a low profile, in part by keeping combat troops out of Bangladesh in recent months. The Bangladesh Government continues—at least publicly—to regard India as its closest ally, but some Bengalis are complaining that New Delhi exerts too much influence over the Dacca government and that India somehow shares responsibility for Bangladesh's economic travails.

77 Opposition elements do not yet appear to be strong or united enough to pose a serious threat to the regime. Under Mujib's leadership, the Awami League has a good chance of holding on to power even after elections are held—perhaps early next year.

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
MOSCOW WOOS THE ARABS

12. Moscow is trying to exploit the Israeli military action and the threat of more to come to emphasize Arab vulnerability and to underscore the value of Soviet support. There are no signs, however, that this sort of activity has eased the strain in Soviet-Egyptian relations—Moscow's primary problem in the Arab world. >

munique issued on 19 September promised Soviet help in strengthening Iraqi defense capability. >

12. < This sort of display suits the current interests of both countries, but neither side has any illusion about the realities of the relationship. The Iraqi recently told the Turkish foreign minister, for example, that they are on guard against a too-assertive Soviet influence. For its part, Moscow does not want to be heavily committed in a country that often changes governments, nor does it want to be caught in the middle between Iran and Iraq. >

LEBANON



The Soviets may have floated the idea of a standard friendship treaty and of port visits by Soviet ships in the hope that the current threat from Israel might make Lebanon more amenable than it has been to such proposals in the past. Even if Lebanon refuses, as seems likely, the Soviets gained some mileage out of Lebanese press coverage that portrayed the Azimov-Franjiyah meeting as another example of Soviet support for the Arab world. >

EGYPT

10. < Relations with Cairo are stalemated. The Egyptian ambassador, who left Moscow shortly after the expulsion of Soviet advisers, has not yet returned. Egyptian diplomats in Moscow recently told US Embassy officials that the Soviets are still stalling on Sadat's call for a summit. In light of this, the appointment of a new Egyptian charge has raised speculation that Cairo intends to keep relations at that level until they receive a satisfactory response to Sadat's proposal. >

IRAQ

11. < The six-day visit of Iraqi President al-Bakr also helped Moscow dramatize the rewards of close relations with the Soviet Union. Warm compliments were exchanged at state functions, economic protocols were signed, and the com-

6. < Soviet pique over the expulsion from Egypt was expressed by a public lecturer in Leningrad who called Sadat a "reactionary" and a "religious fanatic." Although these lecturers are not generally official spokesmen, in this instance the commentary probably was an accurate reflection of Moscow's frustration with Egypt. >



Israeli Task Force in Lebanon

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MEXICO: SECURITY AND STUDENTS

37 <The Echeverria government, which seems satisfied with its progress in solving many of Mexico's social and economic woes, is still searching for an antidote to nagging security and student problems.>

38 <When President Echeverria entered office two years ago, his administration set about simultaneously attacking corruption, poverty, maladministration, inequitable distribution of income, and concentration of political and economic power. The administration feels it has made headway, pointing to such initiatives as "dialogues" with dissenting elements, to increased spending on social welfare projects, to decisions on university policy favorable to students, and to expanded credit for rural development.>

39 <But all is not running smoothly, as was dramatically illustrated by the bombings on 14-15 September of government buildings and American companies, and by the two ambushes this summer of army troops by guerrilla leader Lucio Cabanas. Government officials say they do not consider the situation serious, maintaining that these activities reflect nothing more than simple lawlessness. While there is probably some truth to this claim, there is evidence that some of the violence has a political coloration. No particular group has claimed responsibility for the recent bombings, but explosions earlier in the month have been attributed to a peasant-labor guerrilla organization known to have an extreme leftist political orientation.>

40 <Early in the year, after security forces compiled a string of successes against guerrillas and criminals, officials claimed they had "broken the backbone" of the terrorist movement. Yet, the politically motivated Cabanas and his band continue to roam the rugged mountains of Guerrero State, and radicals are able to embarrass the government with bombings. Officials, despite their outward calm, are no doubt concerned that the security problem will get worse.>

41 <Student agitation, although overshadowed in recent days by the guerrilla violence, is another

irritant. Student unrest seems to be centered in provincial universities, especially those in Puebla, Nuevo Leon, and Sinaloa. While there have been clashes between students and the authorities, violence involving rival student groups representing ideological extremes has been on the rise lately, with rightist groups, supported by conservatives in the Mexican establishment, fighting leftists. Echeverria is making a concerted effort to win over student critics, yet has not moved against the rightist gangs whose involvement in last year's bloody student clash has never been adequately explained. Echeverria apparently is hoping that his social and economic reforms will, in time, rob student militants of their causes. In the meantime, he will deal with student unrest firmly, knowing that serious trouble, always a very real possibility, could damage his progressive image.

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BAHAMAS: ON TO INDEPENDENCE

42 <Prime Minister Pindling's landslide victory in the election on 19 September promises important shifts in Bahamian relations with the US.

43 <Pindling's Progressive Liberal Party won a strong mandate for its pledge to seek full independence from Britain by next July, and London has made it clear that the "will of the people" will be granted. Formal Bahamian-UK talks on independence will probably begin in London this December.>

44 <The party won 29 of the 38 contested House of Assembly seats while the opposition Free National Movement won only eight. A tie vote for the remaining seat will be settled later by a runoff election. Although independence was an underlying but little publicized issue in the campaign, the importance of race—the government party campaigned as the champion of the black population—and the Prime Minister's own popularity were clearly demonstrated. The

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islands' downward-spiraling economic situation, a problem that the opposition sought unsuccessfully to blame on the Pindling government, does not appear to have had much weight with the electorate. >

94 military support for a showdown. Several commanders recently expressed dissatisfaction with their political leaders and would be reluctant to become involved in the suppression of the mass labor movement. >

89 Pindling made it clear during the election campaign that, following independence, his government expects to set a high price for continued US operation of the four defense-related installations in the Bahamas. These installations include the Atlantic Undersea Test and Evaluation Center at Andros, the US Air Force Eastern Missile Test Range facilities at Grand Bahama, the naval facilities at Eleuthera, and the US Coast Guard LORAN station at San Salvador. These installations are currently operated under agreements with the UK that give the US full freedom in its use of these facilities. It is anticipated that the Pindling administration will press for renegotiation of the base agreements immediately following independence. Pindling is clearly counting on revenue from base rentals to help bolster the deteriorating economy and offset the anticipated loss of British support after independence. >

90 The wage increase becomes effective on 1 October, but the amount, which will be geared to increases in the cost of living, has not been announced. Transport workers said they would strike again if they considered the increase insufficient. >


94 BordaBerry's offer may have given the country a temporary respite from strikes and work stoppages, but it has reportedly angered Economic Minister Forteza, and he may resign. If Forteza goes, BordaBerry's economic woes will grow. Forteza is the architect of current stabilization policies and enjoys the confidence of international lending organizations. >

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URUGUAY: WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE?

90 Pressure from Communist labor unions has forced President BordaBerry to grant a general wage increase that threatens current efforts to reduce inflation, now running at about 60 percent, and virtually rules out any possibility of Uruguay's fulfilling its commitments to the International Monetary Fund for this year. >

90 Although BordaBerry publicly denounced the unions' pressure tactics and stated that he would not give in, he capitulated following a 24-hour transportation strike that began on 15 September. He reportedly wanted to take a harder line with the strikers, but failed to receive



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CHILE: BACK TO POLITICS

Chilean independence celebrations passed quietly this week, despite all the rumors that a military coup would be attempted against the Allende government. The traditional military parade was uneventful, except perhaps for the effect on French and Russian military visitors of the sight of troops goose-stepping to the strains of "Lili Marlene." President Allende ended the observances with a speech pointedly praising the dedication of the military and police forces to their responsibilities of upholding the constitution. >

In fact, the deliberate provocation of violence by extremists of far right and far left in recent weeks may have been counter-productive. It produced, for the most part, revulsion among both civilians and military. Although political tension is still high, attention seems likely to focus now on the legislative elections set for next March. The more moderate opposing factions are already concentrating their efforts on the campaign. The armed forces, however, have been drawn closer to a role in politics than has been the case in many years. The routine annual command changes will almost certainly reflect political pressures. Allende has consistently shown concern over assuring his support in the military. In addition, leaders of all services, aware of the spread of dissatisfaction within the ranks, are probably anxious to tighten up discipline and reinforce institutional unity. >

In the field of foreign affairs, Allende has said that he may appear at the UN General Assembly, which he described as "a good forum to inform the world about problems faced by small countries fighting for their independence." He would almost certainly flay the US Government and US copper companies as responsible for his country's serious economic problems. >

Despite recent strong criticism from the far leftists whose hero he once was, Foreign Minister



Foreign Minister Almeyda and Wife

Clodomiro Almeyda has emerged as Allende's most effective cabinet member. The very pragmatism that his extremist critics call conservatism has been, surprisingly, Almeyda's strong point. One matter that both Allende and Almeyda consider important is Soviet economic assistance. This is picking up, but remains cautious and circumspect, presumably by desire of both countries. >

Two Soviet party Central Committee members, air force commander Kutakhov and Latvian party chief Voss, attended the independence celebrations at the invitation of the military and the Chilean Socialist Party. While their presence during a period of political tension was fortuitous, Moscow is displaying heightened concern over the situation in Chile. Soviet media have weighed in almost daily with items on the "fascist" and "reactionary" foes of Allende, associating them with foreign business interests and the US. >

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TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL CONCERN

47 The international community, deeply shocked by the Munich outrage and nervous over continuing aerial hijackings, is slowly mobilizing for a more general attack on the problem. Shortly after Munich, Secretary General Waldheim proclaimed that the UN cannot be a "mute spectator" to such occurrences. He hopes that an international treaty dealing with terrorism will eventually be adopted. For the present, he is urging that the terrorism item be referred to the General Assembly's legal committee for "measured and calm analysis and discussion" before it is taken up by the full assembly.

49 Even if the procedural path is followed, debate on terrorism will occur in the assembly this year in connection with other agenda items, such as the Middle East. While the Arab states and some African nations would oppose any international action against terrorism, the US and most West European countries would strongly support such action.

54 The General Assembly will consider draft articles prepared by the International Law Commission on prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomats and other internationally protected persons. The assembly may request individual governments to submit comments on the articles as a first step in promoting an international conference—perhaps in 1974—at which a treaty could be adopted.

55 At their recent Rome meeting to prepare an EC summit, the foreign ministers of the European Community condemned acts of terrorism and reprisal in all parts of the world. Senior officials from the EC states will meet shortly to discuss common measures against terrorists such as exchanges of information, tougher alien entry-and-exit control procedures, and coordination of police action.

56 Some progress has been made toward developing effective international sanctions against countries that harbor hijackers. The legal subcommittee of the UN's International Civil Aviation Organization—which has just completed a two-week session in Washington—agreed to forward to

the full Legal Committee an anti-hijacking proposal sponsored by the US, Canada, the UK, and the Netherlands. Some countries voting to forward the proposal made it clear, however, that they did not necessarily favor all its provisions.

58 The proposal, a revised version of a US-Canadian draft that the meeting rejected earlier, reportedly calls for a series of responses against any country that gives refuge to hijackers. The ultimate sanction would be the suspension of air services to the offending nation. The Soviet Union voted against forwarding the proposal, maintaining, as usual, that joint sanctions should be imposed only by the UN Security Council. France, alleging legal problems, abstained.

59 The entry into force of any kind of treaty with sanctions lies far in the future. It would have to be approved by the International Civil Aviation Organization, endorsed at an international convention and ratified by the individual signatory countries. The chief Canadian delegate has said that he does not expect these steps to be completed before 1974, and added that a treaty would be worthless unless it is signed by all the major air-service states.

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
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DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

WEEKLY SUMMARY

Special Report

Burundi: The Long, Hot Summer


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BURUNDI

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The Long, Hot Summer

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19 Throughout the summer, the Republic of Burundi outdid itself in the violence that has been Burundi's trademark since it achieved independence from Belgium in 1962. On 29 April, some 2,000 poorly armed Hutu dissidents quixotically attempted to spark a nationwide revolt against the divided, Tutsi-dominated government of President Michel Micombero. Although the army quickly suppressed the rebels, the insurrection aggravated deep-rooted fears among the minority Tutsis that they would be wiped out by the Hutus. The government whipped up a campaign of reprisals against the Hutu population that lasted all summer. As many as 200,000 Hutus may have perished and perhaps another 100,000 were either left homeless throughout Burundi, or

THINGS FALL APART

*Things fall apart; the center cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,
The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere
The ceremony of innocence is drowned;
The best lack all conviction, while the worst
Are full of passionate intensity.*

William Butler Yeats

crowded into jerry-built refugee camps in neighboring countries.)

19 Burundi's recovery from this major upheaval—the fourth in a decade—will be slow, painful, and, in all likelihood, temporary. Although the vast majority of Burundi's three million Hutus refused to support the insurrection, the fears of the country's 600,000 Tutsis have not been diminished. Many members of the ruling Tutsi elite continue to call for harsh repression as the only way of staving off a Hutu revolt. The Micombero government is going through the motions of promoting national reconciliation, but in some instances its policies are deliberately obstructive.)

Things Fall Apart

19 The events in Burundi this summer capped a long history of tribal tensions and political infighting. For over four centuries, the aggressive Tutsis constituted a warrior caste supporting four royal clans that produced Burundi's kings. The Tutsis acted as an instrument of coercion against the country's docile, pastoral Hutu majority. Rival princes of royal blood, competing for the throne, formed alliances with powerful Tutsi chieftains, promoting regional Tutsi factionalism that has survived to the present day. At the same time, however, the royal princes, distrustful of

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Tutsi power, fostered the growth of a counter-vailing Hutu elite. Four centuries of dynastic conflict eventually brought about the destruction of the royal clans and opened the way for post-independence power struggles between Tutsis and Hutus and between rival factions within these tribes.>

19 <A sharpening of Hutu-Tutsi tensions in Burundi was foreshadowed in 1959 by a Hutu revolution in neighboring Rwanda that violently dislodged Rwanda's dominant Tutsi minority. Tens of thousands of Tutsis were killed or forced into exile, and Burundi's Tutsis came face to face with the realization that it could happen to them. The assassination in September 1961 of Burundi's prime minister - designate, Prince Rwagasore, only two weeks after elections were held to select the post-independence government, shattered hopes of future tribal unity and national unity. Although a Tutsi, he was linked to the Hutus by marriage. Upon his death, leaders from the two tribes struggled to establish themselves as his legitimate successor.>

19 <Burundi's first four years of independence as a constitutional monarchy thus were marked by a succession of assassinations and attempted assassinations. The attempt on the life of a Hutu prime minister in 1965 provoked Hutu elements in the army and gendarmerie to try a coup. Micombero, a Tutsi and an army captain, quickly put down the attempt, and a bloody repression of the Hutus followed.>

19 <When Micombero finally seized power and abolished the monarchy in 1966, he felt a need for national unity. He sought a reconciliation with the Hutu elite. He allowed Hutus back into the country's only political party, the civil service, and the government—although important positions were reserved for Tutsis. In suppressing the monarchy, Micombero created a political void that was quickly filled by a horde of Tutsi opportunists whose pursuit of power and aggrandizement has few rivals in Africa. It led to a bitter rivalry between a strongly anti-Western and anti-Hutu extremist faction concentrated in southern Burundi, and a pro-Western, technocratic, north-

ern faction that also harbors fears of Hutu revolution but prefers conciliation to repression.>

19 <The see-saw political struggle between these two groups continued until the fall of 1971. The southern faction, using its control of the justice and foreign affairs ministries and its influence within the army and bureaucracy, successfully engineered the downfall of a number of ranking moderates within the cabinet on charges of plotting against the government. At the same time, the foreign minister, who himself had spent time in prison in 1967 for allegedly plotting against the government, overrode moderate opposition and pushed through a resumption of diplomatic relations with Peking, suspended since the alleged Chinese involvement in the coup plot of 1964.>

19 <Micombero, caught as usual between the extremes, sought to replace the shattered moderate faction by setting up an army-dominated Supreme Revolutionary Council. But the army was also caught up in the factional disputes and the council quickly slipped into nothingness. By early 1972, the Micombero government was all but paralyzed; disunity within the Tutsi oligarchy was on public display.>

19 <On 29 April 1972, Micombero tried to regain political momentum by dismissing his entire cabinet along with a number of other high-ranking government officials. He only went half-way, however, and failed to name any replacements. His move was immediately eclipsed when a Hutu insurrection broke out in southern Burundi.

In Cold Blood

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1 <The rebels doubtless hoped to take advantage of the growing disunity within the Tutsi oligarchy. >


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2 <The rebels, perhaps 2,000 strong, struck in a series of attacks against major population centers and army garrisons in southern Burundi. Among

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Special Report

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22 September 1972

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the areas hardest hit was Bururi Province, the home area of President Micombero and the stronghold of the southern extremist faction. Virtually all Bururi provincial authorities, who were gathered for a political rally near the provincial capital, were assassinated. The rebels failed, however, to kill the justice and information ministers, who had gone to Bururi to investigate reports of local unrest.>

19 <The rebels failed to gain any popular support, despite appeals for Hutu unity, forced conscription, and liberal doses of black magic. Burundi's 3,000-man army struck back hard and, after several weeks of fighting, pushed the rebels into isolated pockets along the coast of Lake Tanganyika. Despite the crisis, Micombero took no steps to name a new government, and the extremist members of his previous cabinet apparently continued to act in their former capacities and to use their influence to direct much of the anti-rebel and later anti-Hutu campaigns.>

3 <The Tutsi elite was divided over where to place the blame for the insurrection. Micombero reportedly was convinced it had been inspired by Chinese and North Korean agents who had been training Hutu dissidents in remote areas along the Burundi-Tanzanian border. 4 <Officially, the government claimed that the rebellion was the work of imperialist agents from neighboring countries in league with monarchists intent on restoring the former king. The king had been lured back from Uganda in early April on assurances of amnesty. He was immediately arrested on charges of planning a mercenary invasion and was executed on orders from Micombero on the eve of the insurrection. 5 <Extremist Tutsis within the government also attempted to place blame for the insurrection on Westerners, particularly the Belgians.>

19 <Foremost in the Tutsi mind, however, was the specter of a nationwide Hutu uprising, reminiscent of the 1959 bloodbath in Rwanda, and what it thought of as narrow escapes in Burundi itself following the coup attempts of 1965 and 1969. These fears led the government to embark upon a systematic purge of the Hutu elite. Civil servants, party functionaries, army personnel,

even students in the capital were arrested, "interrogated," executed, and buried in mass graves outside the city. Although the government claimed it uncovered evidence of an extensive Hutu plot, probably no more than a handful of the victims were actually involved.>

19 <The systematic purge of Hutus in the capital quickly spread throughout the country, particularly in the south. The army, under the pretext of searching out rebel survivors, began a campaign of open liquidation of the Hutus. Regional officials, the party—particularly its headstrong youth organization—and, finally, the Tutsi populace in general all took their cue from the central authorities, and the extermination became wholesale. 6 <Despite the ferocity of the pogrom, the Hutus fought back on only few occasions, exhibiting a fatalism born of four centuries of feudal subservience to Tutsi authority. It left foreign observers stunned.>

The Cost of the Violence

7 <By the end of May, after a month of killing, foreign missionaries estimated that about 100,000 Hutus had been murdered or left homeless. 8 <Large areas of southern Burundi had been devastated. By late August, when the repression had begun to run its course, perhaps as many as 200,000 Hutus had been killed. 9 <In addition, international relief workers estimate that 50,000 had fled to Zaire, 20,000 to Tanzania, and 5,000 to Rwanda, and that the number of Hutu refugees is still rising. By way of comparison, the abortive insurrection that sparked the devastation killed an estimated 1,000-2,000 Tutsis.>

19 <The economic loss to Burundi has been incidental. Although thousands of Hutu peasants were driven off, their crops and homes burned, they were mostly subsistence farmers who made little contribution to the national economy. Bujumbura, the capital and major commercial center, was hardly affected by the violence; business continued without interruption. Coffee, Burundi's major cash crop, is grown in the north, which was little affected by the violence. The harvesting and processing of this year's crop has

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been hindered somewhat by disruption of transportation and storage facilities and by the loss of many Hutu workers in the coffee industry.

Covering Up

The political costs have been extensive. Despite fervent appeals from the diplomatic community in Bujumbura, outraged editorials in the Western press, and private pressure from Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko and Tanzanian President Nyerere, Micombero steadfastly refused to curtail the anti-Hutu repression. In the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, he insisted on portraying events in Burundi as a desperate stand by an embattled Tutsi minority to stave off extinction. He argued that at least 20,000 rebels had initiated the insurrection and that their ranks had been swelled by extensive Hutu support. Micombero railed against the foreign press, particularly Belgian, for playing up the repression of Hutus and ignoring Tutsi claims of self-defense.

While Western observers were appalled by the violence, most African leaders were apathetic, and Micombero has been able to use this apathy to advantage. He has openly expressed gratitude for short-lived support provided by Zaire and Tanzania in the early weeks of the summer, implying that both countries accept his version of events. Following the outbreak of the insurrection, Mobutu answered a request for assistance from Micombero by temporarily supplying a battalion of paratroops for guard duty in the capital and several jet fighters for aerial reconnaissance. Mobutu was willing to assist at the time because of a close personal relationship with Micombero and because of reports that Zairian rebels might have been involved with the Hutu dissidents. Later, when the extent of Tutsi reprisals became obvious, Mobutu refused to supply the Burundi Army with much-needed ammunition. Tanzania also initially made some small arms and ammunition available to the Burundi Army, but later refused further aid. Nevertheless, Micombero has openly pointed to both early arrangements as examples of African support for his position.

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122 The failure of the Organization of African Unity to take up the issue of repression in Burundi during or after its summit meeting in Rabat last June also gave Micombero a psychological boost. Although some African leaders have privately expressed dismay at what happened, they have failed to involve themselves, individually or collectively, in any way, preferring to view the affair as an internal Burundian matter.

13 In late June, Micombero accepted a mission from the UN sent to investigate the possibilities of assistance. Again, the Burundi Government played up the visit as a gesture of international support. Although the mission's subsequent report presented an objective account of the horrors there, it failed to gain widespread attention. Secretary General Waldheim has been vainly trying to get Burundi to accept a permanent UN representative.

14 The government has placed restrictions on international relief efforts. These restrictions affect primarily the Hutus and are part of the government effort to play down the extent of Hutu need. The supplies are being diverted to the Tutsis. In late August, the International Red Cross threatened to withdraw from the country rather than submit to this sort of treatment. At present the Red Cross is continuing its operations, but only in heavily populated Tutsi areas in the south.

New Faces of 1972

15 On 14 July, more than ten weeks after the slaughter began, President Micombero announced the formation of a new cabinet. Its broad nature stood in sharp contrast to the repression then taking place. As a conciliatory gesture and to counter Western charges of anti-Hutu policies, Micombero weighted his new cabinet in favor of the moderates and included several token Hutus who apparently had been saved by the government for just this purpose. The bureaucracy remains dominated by Tutsis, and no Hutu minister will have any real power.

16 Shortly after the new cabinet was announced, Micombero also shuffled the army com-



Micombero

mand. This curtailed, if only temporarily, a factionalism almost as intense as that plaguing the government. Among those dismissed was the deputy army commander, who had directed the army's campaign against Hutu civilians and had also led a purge of moderate Tutsi troops. He was replaced by a northern moderate.

Plus ce change...

19 Though the killings have slowed down and Micombero has made some cosmetic alterations, not much has really changed. All the elements of further tragedy are still there. President Micombero is caught in the middle, preoccupied with perpetuating himself in office. He presides over a government which, despite its relatively moderate bent, seems headed for the same violent fate as its predecessor. Micombero must go on trying to balance rival factions intent on destroying each other regardless of the consequences.

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19 (The Tutsi oligarchy continues to be obsessed with the specter of its own destruction and is incapable of recognizing that it may indeed be engineering conditions in which the prophecy will be fulfilled. The new prime minister, stumping the countryside immediately after his appointment, kept old fears and hatreds alive. He told his predominantly Tutsi audiences that peace had been restored, but virtually in the same breath, reminded them that "traitors" continued in their midst. Extremists have kept up appeals to anti-Hutu sentiment, and isolated incidents are continuing throughout the countryside.)

19 (Virtually all Hutus with any degree of education have been wiped out, and Tutsi control of education is likely to make it virtually impossible that they will be replaced.)

19 (These refugees also pose an internal threat to the countries in which they are living. In Zaire, thousands of refugees have settled in an eastern area of the country where Zairian rebels linger. Moreover, both Zaire and Tanzania harbor large numbers of Tutsi refugees from Rwanda who did not go to Burundi following the bloodbath of 1959. This raises the possibility of clashes between the two tribes in their host countries.)

19 (Although the Tutsis in Burundi have managed a sort of unity in the face of a common threat, political factionalism seems as strong as

ever. Moderate Tutsis belatedly recognize that the extremists took advantage of the anti-Hutu repression to thin moderate ranks within the army and bureaucracy. The extremists, already influential within the army and the bureaucracy, are attempting to pack both with still more of their supporters. The new cabinet cannot be expected to pull together on many issues.)

19 (Although international relief efforts are getting under way, the Burundi Government continues to restrict distribution of relief supplies and to requisition internationally donated supplies for its own use, no doubt for distribution to Tutsis.)

18 (The Belgian Government, appalled by the violence, has been reappraising its role as Burundi's major foreign supporter. Brussels does not wish to be further identified with a repressive government; this, together with political disagreement in Burundi, has brought about a deadlock in renegotiations on Belgian aid, particularly educational and military assistance. This situation is not likely to change.)

19 (Micombero so far has taken only stopgap measures to patch up the country's divisions, and indeed that may be as far as he can go. Given the deep-rooted tribal tensions and political rivalries, seriously aggravated by recent events, the government may never be able to move toward a genuine reconciliation between Tutsis and Hutus or between extremist and moderate Tutsis. These must somehow be reconciled if Burundi is to forestall an even more violent upheaval.)



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